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MOVING TOWARDS A COLLABORATIVE
FAMILY LAW PARADIGM: THE STRUGGLE TO
BRING NON-LITIGIOUS DIVORCE TO THE
MASSES
Marsha B. Freeman *

INTRODUCTION
Despite changes in demographics re marriage, including the fact
that fewer people are entering into marriage and more are having
children outside of marriage than ever before, 1 United States divorce
rates remain consistently high, and dissolution cases a large portion of a
family law practice. 2 A large proportion of these dissolutions are
procured through traditional litigation, 3 and the original litigation
frequently leads to more post-dissolution, as restructured families
attempt to refine original custody and support orders. 4
Family law attorneys have long complained of the negative aspects
of litigated divorce, finding it stressful and unpredictable for themselves,
and expensive and punishing for their clients. 5 Many family law
attorneys have become so disillusioned with their roles in the process
that they aspire to change or leave the practice altogether. 6 Family law
attorneys recognize that litigation is often an unsatisfactory and
*

Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law.
Elizabeth F. Beyer, A Pragmatic Look at Mediation and Collaborative Law as
Alternatives to Family Law Litigation, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 303, 304 (2008).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 304-05.
5
See Susan Daicoff, Collaborative Law: A New Tool for the Lawyer’s Toolkit, 20 U. Fla.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 113, 115 (2009) (explaining that the process for divorce for everyone
involved is best highlighted through many unflattering terms.).
6
See Thurman w. Arnold III, The Growing Role of Mediation and Collaborative Law in
Family Law Cases, 2012 WL 2166802 (July 2012), at *1 (describing the story of Stu
Webb who has long been known as an official “founder” of collaborative law.).
1
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ineffective model to resolve family disputes, especially divorce and its
related issues. 7 The Divorce process has long been recognized to cause
emotional trauma second only to the death of a spouse; stages of
recovery are comparable to those experienced with the death of a loved
one. 8 While enduring these immense emotional upheavals, Clients are
nevertheless required to make some of the most important and complex
parenting and financial decisions of their lives at what is likely to be
some of their worst coping and reasoning abilities. 9 At the same time,
children of the divorce need their parents’ help in coping with the
emotional and perhaps physical changes in their lives that result from
changes in the family structure; however, these children are far less
likely to get the emotional help needed when the parents are also trying
to process these changes and fight a litigious battle. 10 Besides the
difficulties of all going through the divorce litigation process, the simple
fact is that even after all of these struggles the courts are woefully
inadequate to appropriately respond to the emotional needs of the family
members. 11 Numerous studies have documented the inability of the
courts to satisfactorily resolve the emotional issues for both the children
and parties of high-conflict litigated divorce. 12
Family law cases in general, and particularly those involving
dissolution, were long considered similar to any other kind of civil
action, with the assumption that the best and most-just results are reached
when the parties are represented by adversaries in front of a neutral
decision-maker. 13 This assumption unfortunately failed to take into
account the inherent differences between family cases and other civil
actions: namely, the intensely personal nature of the action. 14 Family law
by its very makeup deals with personal, emotional issues, far more so
than the average contract claim. 15 While personal injury actions may
7

Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 318 (2004).
Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 321
(2004).
9
Id.
10
Id. at 322.
11
Id.
12
Id.; See generally Judith S. Wallerstein and Julia Lewis, The Long-Term Impact of
Divorce on Children: A First Report from a 25-Year Study, 36 FAM. & CONCILIATION
COURTS REV. 368 (1998) (documenting the views of 130 children of divorce over a
twenty-five year period, and determining the inability of both parties and the courts to
satisfactorily resolve the emotional needs of the children, especially those children whose
families utilized the litigation process of divorce.).
13
Deborah Cantrell, The Role of Equipoise in Family Law, 14 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 63, 67
(2012).
14
Id.
15
Deborah Cantrell, The Role of Equipoise in Family Law, 14 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 63, 67
(2012).
8
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instill similar emotion in the injured party, it is difficult to analogize even
that to the intense sense of personal loss, suffering, financial fears and
perhaps even humiliation frequently brought on by a divorce. 16 Even the
theoretically objective issues raised by a divorce, including custody,
visitation and support, are inextricably entwined with the emotional
needs and fears of the parties and the children of the divorce. 17
Even if the courts are theoretically capable of dealing with at least
the objective resolution of these issues in the divorce, the courts are
sorely ill equipped to adequately resolve the emotional needs underlying
them. 18 Making a determination on custody based on objective standards
frequently does little to alleviate the pain and fears accompanying the
ruling for both the parties and the children. 19 Judges not only
acknowledge a lack of training in the social sciences necessary to deal
with the underlying trauma afflicting families of divorce, but are often
also reluctant to even step into those roles, seeing themselves, rightly so,
as neutral decision-makers than psychologists or social workers. 20
As a result of the intense study of family law litigation and its
deficiencies, other means of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), which
is frequently used in other areas of law, began to be applied in the family
law arena, particularly to divorce. 21 Mediation is one of the facets of
ADR most frequently utilized, in some cases required, in family law
cases. 22
In mediation a neutral facilitator, often a lawyer or mental health
professional, assists the parties in formulating their own issues,

16

17

Id.

See generally Marsha B. Freeman, Reconnecting the Family: A Need for
Sensible Visitation Schedules for Children of Divorce, 22 Whittier L. Rev. 779
(2001) (noting that the changing roles in the family cause tremendous upheaval
for all involved.).

18

Cantrell, supra note 13, at 67.
Id.; See also Wallerstein and Lewis, supra note 12, at 368.
20
See Marsha B. Freeman, Love Means Always Having to Say You’re Sorry: Applying the
Realities of Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Family Law, 17 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 215, 230
(2008) (discussing one of the definitive commentaries to the idea of moving towards a
therapeutic approach to family law, especially dissolution, that came from Pauline H.
Tessler in her article Collaborative Law: A New paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y AND L. 967 (1999). Stu Webb is credited with formally originating
the concept of collaborative divorce in the early 1990’s, however; Tessler’s article took it
to a widespread viewership and greatly spread the idea among divorce attorneys and
other allied professionals.).
21
Margaret B. Drew, Collaboration and Coercion, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 79, 79-80
(2013).
22
Id. See also FLA. STAT. 44.1011 (requiring mediation before the dissolution case
comes before a Circuit Court judge for settlement.).
19
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prioritizing them and reaching conclusions on them. 23 In many ways, this
gives parties the ability to direct their own case and make their own
decisions, hopefully preferable to a judge with no real knowledge or
understanding of them or their children. 24 Since so many couples today
go into dissolution proceedings pro se, without counsel, due to costs or
other reasons 25, this is a generally lower cost method of resolution that
also allows for more control by the parties. 26 Although positively
received in many instances, mediation nevertheless has its own
problems, particularly where parties are unrepresented by counsel and
may not be cognizant nor strong enough to stand up to a domineering
partner or even mediator. 27
Mediation may not be the panacea, but litigated divorce has long
been found to be not just anathema to the idea of truly resolving personal
issues, but a frankly inadequate method on many practical levels. One
commentator describes litigated divorce in the United States as “war by
proxy.” 28 Yet, while a number of ADR methods such as mediation have
been utilized, the legal profession has been slow to move away from
litigated divorce, despite knowing its severe limitations. 29
Over the past couple of decades, the concept of collaborative law
has grown as an attempt to overcome deficiencies of litigation in family
law while still allowing the parties the ability to forge their own
agreement on their own terms. 30 In its most formal configuration,
collaborative law includes an agreement among the parties and attorneys
that the case will be settled without resort to litigation, and encompasses
a disqualification agreement that bars the attorneys from representing the
parties in any subsequent litigation. 31 The purpose of the agreement is to
23

Marsha B. Freeman, Divorce Mediation: Sweeping Problems Under the Rug, Time to
Clean House, 78 U. DET. MERCY L.REV. 67, 78-9 (2000).
24
Id. at 68.
25
Arnold, supra note 6, at 3.
26
Freeman, supra note 23 at 73 (explaining that arbitration is basically a private form of
litigation with less formality and cost. Arbitration is also another ADR method used less
often in divorce cases, likely because those seeking an alternative to courts want more
control over their own case.).
27
Id.
28
Constance Ahrons, The Good Divorce, Harper Collins Publishers, New York 1994, at
178 (likening litigated divorce to the hiring of gladiators (litigators) to battle for the
parties. These warriors treat the spouses as angry enemies who above all need protection
from their spouses, and promotes a system which destroys the potential for future
cooperation.)). (cited in Terri Breer: has the Family Law System Reached a Tipping
Point?, 51 MAR. ORANGE COUNTY (CAL.) LAWYER, March 2009, at 23.).
29
Breer, supra note 28, at 23.
30
Gary L. Voegele, Linda K. Wray and Ronald D. Ousky, Collaborative Law: A Useful
Tool for the Family Law Practitioner to Promote Better Outcomes, 33 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 971, 974 (2007).
31
Id.
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motivate all parties involved to settle in a collaborative setting; with the
attorneys presumably not wanting to lose the case and the parties
hopefully unwilling to start all over again with new counsel. 32
Many proponents of collaborative law promote and follow this
formal iteration, convinced that the motivations of the agreement are
necessary to further its results. Others are willing to allow for variables,
and in fact promote any and all alternatives to litigation, starting with
pure negotiation and moving into mediation and cooperative law. 33 In
many ways, this less formal non-litigation methodology may well help
bring collaborative law to the masses, allowing for less costly
alternatives than its more formal relation.
While the negative effects of litigated divorce, especially those
in the high conflict realm, are felt over all socio-economic spectrums,
there is no doubt that some of them are more likely to hit those in the
lower classes even harder. Children who already will have a harder time
climbing out of poverty or overcoming other financial hardships will be
faced even more so with the necessity of the primary custodian parent,
often mom, having to work harder and longer hours to make ends meet,
or perhaps being out of the house far more than she previously was. 34
Children who were used to coming home after school may now be
required to attend before and/or after school care, taking them away from
their routines and their friends. 35 Non-custodial fathers may not have the
time or inclination to be with their children, often resenting the money
they now have to turn over for child support. 36 Children, who lose the
guidance of their fathers, and in many cases mothers, often have a harder
time dealing with life issues. 37 Children of divorce have traditionally
been found to engage in delinquency more often, become pregnant as
teenagers, marry younger, use more drugs, and divorce earlier and in
higher numbers. 38 In these cases, the nuclear family is not just
32

Id.
See generally Freeman, supra note 20 (describing cooperative law as allowing the
possibility of judicial involvement, however with this possibility comes some restraint
such as the judge’s acceptance in a role of mover rather than the decision-maker.). See
also Marsha B. Freeman & James D. Hauser, Making Divorce Work: Teaching a Mental
Health/Legal Paradigm to a Multidisciplinary Student Body, 6 BARRY L. REV. 1, 5
(2006) (explaining that in a cooperative scenario, the parties may seek the aid of the court
in resolving or helping with specific issues, but all agree that the final outcome should
ideally be an amicable agreement between the parties. The judge in these cases sees his or
her role as more of a facilitator, with the weight of the court behind him or her, rather
than a traditional decision-maker.).
34
Wallerstein & Lewis, supra note 19, at 368.
35
Freeman, supra note 20, at 230.
36
Wallerstein & Lewis, supra note 19, at 368.
37
Id.
38
Freeman, supra note 20, at 230.
33
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reorganized, but very possibly destroyed by the sheer volume of worry
and financial hardship faced by both parents and the lack of available
energy and supervision for the children. 39
Part II of this article will discuss the state of collaborative law
today and the need for it over all classes of parties. It will also look at the
barriers to instituting collaborative divorce based primarily on the cost
factors incurred. Part III will discuss the ethical problems in both divorce
litigation collaborative divorce, and will show the need to provide
financially feasible collaborative alternatives for middle and lower
income families. Part IV and the conclusion will present proposed
methods of bringing collaborative family law into the mainstream.
II: COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE TODAY
While collaborative law began as a fairly small and sometimes
informal movement in the United States in the 1980’s and 90’s, it has
had an oftentimes far greater application in other nations, including
England, Australia and Canada. 40 The Canadian government
commissioned a well-documented three year study of the method in
2001, 41 and Canada and other nations still rely in far greater part on
collaborative law in family cases than does the Unites States. 42 In other
nations, as well as the United States, collaborative law has been used
extensively in the areas of juvenile law, incorporating the concept of
restorative justice, where offender and victim are often urged to work out
the issues in a collaborative manner with the goal of benefitting both.43
In the United States, collaborative family law has had a historical basis in
interdisciplinary work, with one model, used in many areas, adding
mental health professionals and financial analysts to the mix, 44 while

39
See; e.g., Straley v. Frank, 585 So. 2d 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), 650 So. 2d 628
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Rosen v. Rosen, 386 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980),
528 So. 2d 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), 576 So. 2d 308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990), 696
So .2d 697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998), 833 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Sibley v. Sibley, 833 So. 2d 847
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that in many cases, the litigated divorce is literally
‘never-ending,’ at least until the children are grown. And, that in many cases the parents
fight over custodial and support issues for years, until literally they don’t exist any
longer.).
40
Voegele, supra note 30, at 975.
41
Id.
42
Freeman, supra note 20, at 230. See also Julie Macfarlane, Experiences of
Collaborative Law: Preliminary Results from The Collaborative Lawyering Research
Project, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 180 (2004).
43
See generally Deborah J. Chase & Peggy Fulton Hora, Drug Court Judges Get to
Color Outside the Lines, 37 CT. REV. 12, 12 (Spring 2000).
44
Voegele, supra note 30, at 976.
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others, based on the original Minnesota model, rely mainly on the
attorneys-only format. 45
The reasons for the spread of collaborative family law have their
roots in lawyer dissatisfaction as well as an ever-expanding
understanding of the negative impact of litigation in family law cases,
especially dissolution. 46 Family court judges, as well, are frustrated by
the inability of the court to make a satisfactory impact on the emotional
needs of the family, recognizing that better outcomes result from
agreement reached between the parties, outside of the judicial litigation
process. 47 In many cases, this can be achieved through nothing more than
planned negotiation between the parties, or the parties plus attorneys. It
is only where greater conflict occurs that cases move forward in
litigation. It is these perennially high conflict cases that have spurred the
movement towards the use of collaborative family law as an alternative
to the failures of litigation.
Although the use of methods of collaborative dissolution has
expanded dramatically over the past couple of decades, 48 one major
45

Id.
See generally Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interest of
the Children and the Adversarial System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79 (1997).
47
Drew, supra note 21, at 79. See also Freeman, supra note 20, at 230
(arguing for an expansion beyond the precepts of collaborative family law to
that of a therapeutic jurisprudence approach in family law cases. And, also
that while the collaborative approach clearly pushes the parties to participate
in a more civilized and hopefully amicable manner, therapeutic
jurisprudence takes the proceedings beyond conduct to include a greater
attempt to understand and address the underlying emotional issues of the
parties. Also, that the purpose of the article was not to attempt to delve into
therapeutic jurisprudence, and instead focuses on moving the collaborative
concept from merely an alternative to litigation for the wealthier to more
affordability for lower income and even indigent clients.
And last, that while a number of states have taken steps to promote or even
require aspects of collaborative divorce (Beyer, supra note 1, at 306-07);
Nationally, the Uniform Law Commissions adopted the Uniform
Collaborative Law Act (UCLA) in 2009. The Act provides a number of
provisions and recommendations, and urges adoption by all the states. To
date, while many of the states have taken up the Act and promoted a number
of its articles, only
have formally adopted it in whole or in part.)); Some
states have adopted collaborative family law statutes aside from the UCLA,
including Texas and California (see California Family code 2013(b), calling
for all parties and allied professionals hired by them to attempt to resolve
the case “on an agreed basis” but without setting forth specific protocols for
doing so. A number of the California Superior Courts have enacted rules
designed to provide more substance to the statute. See Strategies for Family
Law in California, 2012 Edition, Leading Lawyers on Understanding
developments in California Family Law; See also Frederick J. Glassman,
The State of Collaborative Law: Past, Present and Future, 2012 WL
2166808 (July 1 2012).
46
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barrier, other than simply changing the mindset of those involved in
divorce litigation, remains. That is the cost of the process itself. While
collaborative divorce is promoted as a cost efficient alternative to
litigated divorce, the reality is not always apparent. While collaborative
divorce with a “small C”, as this author likes to call it, can be as simple
as negotiated settlement or perhaps include fairly low cost mediation, the
more formal iteration of collaborative divorce, or that with a “Capital C”,
involves the aforementioned formal agreements and generally comprises
a panel of experts in addition to the parties and lawyers, said panel
consisting of a mental health professional, a financial expert, and often a
coach, and sometimes adding in children’s therapists as well. 49 While
there are set fees here instead of hourly billing, and the result should
theoretically be less costly than a drawn-out litigation battle, it is
speculative how much is really saved. A ‘typical’ cost of a litigated
divorce, combined, has been estimated to be almost $75,000 for both
parties, combined. 50 While the cost of the panel may be lower, it is still
unlikely to be within the means of most middle-class families, let alone
those in the lower economic classes. And while the litigated divorce will
likely be drawn out, a negative factor in many ways, its costs will also be
derived over time, not all at once, which could actually be a help in
meeting them. The collaborative divorce, however, with its emotionally
preferred shorter time span, requires payment in a short time frame as
well, perhaps making it even more financially inaccessible than litigation
for those with fairly limited means. 51
Of course, for those without extensive resources needed to pay
these kinds of fees, both of these types of dissolution may be beyond
them. Pro se divorces are said to make up approximately 70-80% of
filings in many jurisdictions, 52 no doubt in many cases due to the desire
not to have traditional litigation make the emotional situation worse, but
also undoubtedly due to the staggering costs involved. But because lower
income families cannot afford traditional litigation or collaborative
divorce, doesn’t mean they wouldn’t and shouldn’t benefit greatly from
it. Their children will not only have serious resentments and emotional
strife from the divorce, but are also more likely to suffer the
consequences outlined above.

49

Daicoff, supra note 5, at 117-118.
Beyer, supra note 1, at 305.
51
There is not as much data on the costs of collaborative divorce, since the practice is
more varied and widespread. Estimates however range from $5000-$10000 up per panel
member, depending on their level of experience and expertise in the field, which can
drive the costs upwards of $50,000. (Author’s own knowledge.).
52
Glassman, infra note 72, at *1 .
50
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Collaborative law is founded on a problem-solving, rather than
adversarial, approach. 53 It allows the parties to determine their needs and
interests, rather than having a court define and decide them. 54 Rather
than the court responding to openly adversarial positions, collaborative
law encourages the parties to deal with each other in a more respectful
way, keeping in mind their goals of putting their children and their
futures first. 55
Rather than courts superimposing their view of a functioning
family, the collaborative divorce allows the parents to recognize the
different interactions of the children with the parents and define for
themselves the preferred changes in the family structure. 56 The child’s
own ‘microsystem,’ 57 consisting of their family unit and the interactions
within it, will best define the child’s development. The parents, rather
than a stranger court accustomed to deciding adversarial issues, are best
able and allowed to determine their children’s present and future needs. 58
Research shows that marriages ending in more amicable divorce are
likely to have less negative, possibly even positive or at least neutral,
effects on the children. 59 Parties going through a more civil collaborative
divorce, defining issues and making decisions for themselves, are more
likely to learn how to deal with each other better in the future and inflict
less harm on their children while doing so. 60
III: THE ETHICAL PRACTICE OF FAMILY LAW MANDATES A
MOVE TO COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE FOR ALL
At present costs, collaborative divorce is for all practical
purposes a substitute for litigated divorce only for those with the
resources to pay for either one. It is not, for the most part, accessible to
those with more modest means. Theoretically, couples with limited
53

Tessler, supra note 20, at 967.
Barbara A. Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law Jurisprudence:
Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L.J. 775, 775 (1997).
55
See generally CONF. OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, POSITION PAPER ON EFFECTIVE
MANAGEMENT
OF
FAMILY
LAW
CASES
(2002),
ttp://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/WhitePapers/EffectiveMgmtFamlyLaw.pdf. (last visited Sept. 6,
2013).
56
Babb, supra note 119, at 788 (citing to studies by Professor Urie Bronfenbrenner on
the ecology of human development); see also Freeman, supra note 20, at 230.
57
Id. at 789.
58
Id. at 790-91.
59
Victoria Clayton, Divorce Doesn’t Have to Destroy the Kids, MSNBC, Dec. 11, 2007,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/21474430/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2013) (citing research done by
nonprofit organizations).
60
Id.
54
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income are no more likely to be able to afford collaborative divorce than
they could a costly litigated one. If they litigate, they are more apt to opt
for a pro se divorce rather than be represented by counsel, a disadvantage
in a litigated setting in many cases, especially if only one of them is
unable to afford an attorney. Yet they are unlikely to be able to take
advantage of the collaborative process as an alternative, as it too carries a
hefty price tag. Yet costly or not, lower income families have just as
much need, perhaps in some ways more, for collaborative divorce than
their wealthier neighbors.
As noted, children of divorce have generally higher rates
of teen drug use, pregnancy, marriage, and delinquency. 61 Children of
divorce from lower income families are already likely struggling with
less supervision and financial issues even before the divorce, and will be
affected that much more by the kinds of stress and changes taking place
during and after it. Lower income families have just as much need for,
and deserve the ability to access, collaborative divorce as their higher
income counterparts. Since society as a whole is affected by these types
of issues 62, it is incumbent upon us to make the collaborative process as
accessible as possible for those in the lower income brackets, as it is for
those in the higher.
While the advantages to clients of all incomes are fairly obvious,
lawyers representing parties in a collaborative divorce setting are likely
to recognize possible ethical concerns in the practice. And while some of
these concerns may be dealt with more easily in cases involving private,
higher income parties, there may be unique concerns when translating
these practices to lower income forums, such a Legal Aid office.
The Colorado Bar Association, for instance, took aim at the
confidentiality arrangements incorporated into the collaborative divorce
practice, finding that they impede a lawyer’s obligation to provide
undivided loyalty to his/her client. 63 The ABA Ethics Committee
responded by recognizing the benefits inherent in the collaborative
process as long as the clients are fully informed of its requirements. 64
61

Freeman, supra note 20, at 230.
When lower income children get pregnant, become delinquent, use drugs, it is
frequently going to be the state footing the bills in terms of legal, judicial and medical
needs, rather than private funds. (Author’s own knowledge.).
63
Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Canon 7 (1980).
64
See American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Formal Opinion 07-477 (August 9, 2007) (explaining that the ABA
approved the use of collaborative law agreements as long as the client is sufficiently
advised of the benefits and risks of the process, and that the lawyer cannot continue with
the case if the parties proceed to litigation.). See also Freeman, supra note 20, at 230
(describing the ABA’s attempts to protect the professional integrity of the legal process
while advancing the collaborative movement.).
62
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While this theoretical problem may be satisfied by the simple fact of
private representation of both parties, in a lower income setting that may
not be as feasible, and there may well be thoughts as to whether it is
feasible to provide a collaborative setting without the costs of two
attorneys. That alone would represent a major concern for professional
ethics. 65
In another attempt to define new ways to deal with difficult issues
re divorce representation, the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers 66 produced “The Bounds of Advocacy,” 67 a collection of rules
termed ‘aspirational’ since they have not yet been incorporated into the
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. These aspirational rules
attempt to recognize and educate lawyers about both the special place of
attorneys in family law as well as recognize needed changes in the field.
The Bounds recognizes these needed changes for both parties and
lawyers, promoting the ability of family law attorneys to practice in less
confrontational, more holistic setting, envisioning a therapeutic, even
multidisciplinary, system that will not jeopardizing careers. 68 ‘Zealous’
representation in the family law setting is redefined to one harmonious
with the goals of a collaborative, or even therapeutic result, while still
protecting the legal rights and obligations of the clients. 69
While some states have adopted the Bounds as an aspirational
tool for family law attorneys, 70 lawyers may well remain troubled that
following such aspirational goals could find them in noncompliance with
the adopted Rules. States must find a way to protect attorneys while also
moving toward a problem-solving model of family law. The American
Bar Association has recognized this need in endorsing the confidentiality
requirements of collaborative practice. 71 Finding ways to move toward
65

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1980) (explaining that another tenet
of the rules is the admonition to forego conflicts of interest inherent in dual
representation.).
66
See generally The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers,
http://www.aaml.org/about-aaml. (The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers was
founded in 1962.).
67
Id. “The Bounds of Advocacy is an aspirational set of rules which
recognizes the particular role of the family law attorney. While not yet
required in any state, it does seek to guide family lawyers in their
representation of clients, especially recognizing the need for collaborative
settings.”
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Florida has promoted the idea of the Bounds as an appropriate way to deal with issues
of representation in all areas of family law. (Author’s own knowledge.).
71
See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1980). See also American Bar
Association MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2002 ed.) (Preamble, Scope and
Terminology: 3 In addition to these representational functions, a lawyer may serve as a
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such family law practices is a necessity if we are to ensure the best
solutions for all families, including those in the lower socioeconomic
classes. This in turn will hopefully help to stem the negative statistics for
children of these divorces.
IV. TALK IS CHEAP, DIVORCE IS NOT
With at least theoretical choices available today to obtain a
divorce using either litigious or non-litigious means, many believe family
law attorneys have at least an ethical obligation to be proactive in
advising prospective clients of these differing avenues. 72
Courthouses are still often seen as extensive waiting rooms, with
litigants and oftentimes professional witnesses spending hours waiting
(and running up bills). 73 That may well be because even where clients
may be aware of alternatives to litigation, there are not necessarily
trained and willing attorneys ready to take their cases- at least not in
ways that are affordable to most people. A significant number of those
litigants waiting in the courthouse will be pro se, perhaps harming
themselves professionally but saving money by necessity. Many might
well be interested or even anxious to utilize a collaborative system
instead, but do not have the resources to do so- which as noted can cost

third-party neutral, a nonrepresentational role helping the parties to resolve a dispute or
See, e.g., Rules 1.12 and 2.4. In addition, there are Rules that apply to lawyers who law
or to are not active in the practice of practicing lawyers even when they are acting in a
nonprofessional capacity. For example, a lawyer who commits fraud in the conduct of a
business is subject to discipline for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation. See Rule 8.4. Rule 1.12 Former Judge, Arbitrator, Mediator
or Other Third-Party Neutral; a) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not
represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally
and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or law clerk to such a person or
as an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral, unless all parties to the proceeding
give informed consent, confirmed in writing.)).
72
See Frederick J. Glassman, Strategies for Family Law in California, 2012 Edition:
Leading Lawyers on Understanding Developments in California Family Law; The State
of Collaborative Law: Past, Present and Future, 2012 WL 2166808 (July 1 2012)
(explaining that in actuality, the fact is that many family law attorneys are either
unwilling or untrained to participate in collaborative proceedings. And, that there are
areas where those trained in the practice will only work with other attorneys also formally
trained, especially in those cases using the formal collaborative agreements. Also, that it
limits the number of lawyers available for collaborative law and makes those litigators
untrained in it loath to send their clients off to one who is.); see generally Marsha B.
Freeman, Comparing Philosophies and Practices of Family Law Between the United
States and Other Nations: The Flintstones vs. the Jetsons, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 249 (2010)
(noting the far greater strides other nations have made in moving towards a collaborative
family law paradigm.).
73
Breer, supra note 28, at 23.
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close to a professionally led litigated divorce with the additional
downside of the fees being due up front. 74
Collaborative family law, along with other ADR formats, has
been seen as a positive step for resolving family disputes for a number of
years. 75 Parties are expected to remain in charge of both the direction of
the case and its settlement. 76 They are given an opportunity to eschew
costly depositions and formal discovery, as well as make the final
determinations about the futures of them and their children. 77 They can
avoid the costly and lengthy logjam in the family court system, 78
knowing that they have the opportunity to keep control over their
family’s future. Lawyers, as well, see this as a way to avoid working in a
constant state of crisis in their clients’ lives, and instead are able to share
the process, even empower the clients to take much of the
responsibility. 79 But the fact remains that collaborative family law, in
most cases, remains on a par, if not equal, to the costs of an attorney-led
litigated divorce. 80
The question then becomes: if a collaborative divorce will save
time, energy and cost, and will hopefully help to diffuse or reduce the
emotional toll of the divorce process, if not the divorce itself, how do we
make this available to those who may well need it as much as or even
more than others, but who can least afford it in its present state? Large
numbers of middle and lower income parties who litigate their divorces
opt for pro se representation, at least for one of the parties, not because
they likely see themselves as more capable than an attorney, or even
because they long to try the case themselves, but simply due to the
extensive costs involved in hiring attorneys. 81 With the excessive costs of
74

Id.
The author notes that Webb and Tessler along with other commentators have been
promoting the use of collaborative law and other non-litigious divorce processes since the
early 1990’s, although the practice likely was around before that, just not recognized
formally.
76
Frederick J. Glassman, A Way to Resolve with Respect: Exploring the Benefits and
Opportunities of Collaborative Family Law in California, 2010 WL 1976215 (May 2010).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 3 (describing that there are over half a million new family court filings and
petitions in the California court system each year.).
79
Strickland, supra note 73, at 980. See also Nanci A. Smith, Empowering Clients with
Collaborative Family Law, 2011 WL 587388 (Feb. 2011).
80
Beyer, supra notes 1, 50, at 305.
81
When this author was in practice it was not unusual for parties to agree that one will
hire an attorney and the other will be pro se, in the hope that having at least one attorney
will guide them through the process better. Today, far more opt for both parties to
represent themselves, with numbers ranging as high as 70-80 percent of litigants being
pro se. There is little doubt that the spiraling costs of represented litigated divorce in
addition to the severe economic downtown of the last few years has added to this number,
and will likely continue to do so for some time to come.
75
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even a ‘typical’ litigated divorce even middle income litigants are hardpressed to be able to afford counsel.
It is likely many of these litigants would like to use a nonlitigious, less costly route to divorce. Yet they are literally caught
between a rock and a hard place. If they litigate, they can control the
costs dramatically by eschewing lawyers in total. This still entails,
unfortunately, the rest of the negative aspects of litigated divorce, most
noticeably having to take an adversarial stand and try to move forward
from there, and without counsel. 82 It does, however, also give them the
protections afforded by a court overseeing the case and making decisions
where necessary. 83 If the parties desire a non-litigious route, however,
they find themselves in the unique position of having few places to turn.
Mediation will cost far less generally than litigation 84, but an
unrepresented mediation may not be easily resolved or may take more
time, equaling more costs, and can lead to other problems based on the
ability of each of the parties to adequately participate. 85 Lower income
parties are just as aware of the negative effects of litigated divorce, from
cost and time factors to the emotional toll taken on themselves and their
children. 86 Those who want to try the collaborative route, trying
specifically to avoid these pitfalls and eager to do the right thing for
themselves and especially for their children, are likely to find great
difficulty in finding the right route.
Because the formal collaborative agreement requires
representation, lower income parties are in the uncompromising position
of not even being able to take advantage of the process vast numbers of
attorneys, clients and the courts consider far preferable for divorce
dissolution. 87 Unable to represent themselves in any type of formal
collaborative agreement, they are trapped with having to either hope they
can reach agreement through informal negotiation between themselves,
or avail themselves of the court process through pro se representation.
Since many will likely need this protective cloak of the court, they will

82

The mere starting of a litigated action can be the cause of friction between the parties,
as the moving party will need to lay out an offense in the motion and the other will be
forced automatically to defend it. (Authors own Knowledge).
83
Freeman, supra note 20, at 230.
84
Elizabeth Kruse, ADR, Technology, and New Court Rules-Family Law Trends for the
Twenty-First Century, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 207, 208 (2008).
85
See generally Marsha B. Freeman, Divorce Mediation: Sweeping Conflicts Under the
Rug, time to Clean House, MCELROY LECTURE SERIES, 78 UNIV. DET. MERCY L. R.
67 (2000) (discussing a number of the problems inherent in pro se mediation, including
that of the ‘uneven playing field.’).
86
Weinstein, supra note 46, at 79.
87
Kruse, supra note 84, at 211.
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often be forced back into the very litigation system they would like to
escape and which would be a far better route for their family.
Knowing that the collaborative process is fundamentally
better for divorce litigants, the question remains how to structure a
collaborative family law system that will allow lower income clients to
participate. Until that happens, there is little chance of collaborative
family law becoming the accepted paradigm for divorce; the vast
majority of parties will simply have no means to access it and will
remain by default in more costly and emotionally damaging litigation.
Although most middle income parties likely will not have
access to legal aid representation due to being unable to meet the
extremely low income threshold for representation, many lower income
parties seek help from these state and federal funded programs. 88 Legal
aid services, conceptualized in the latter part of the twentieth century by
a Congress far more attuned to providing help for the poor, has been
gutted on both the state and federal levels over the last few decades, 89
and their local offices have had to downside dramatically. In addition,
these sources of funding are needed to provide all types of legal services
to the poor, beginning with constitutionally mandated defense of
counsel. 90 Family law cases, like other civil actions, do not have the
same priority, and are among the first to be cut where necessary. Yet
family law services remain the most in demand. 91
There are more than just idealistic ideals of a better system for
family law access for the poor. Lawyers have a long-standing dedication
to public service, both to provide services to those who cannot afford
them and to support and improve laws and legal institutions. 92 This last
88
Louise G. Trubek, Context and Collaboration: Family Law Innovation and Professional
Autonomy, Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Persons:
Professional and Ethical Issues, 67 FORD. L. REV. 2533, 2533 (1999).
89
Id. (explaining that the vast majority of these services are provided through the Legal
Services Corporation (LSC), which has seen its funding drastically cut by Congress in
recent years. Also, that another source of funding for poor clients is Interest on Lawyer
Trust Accounts (IOLTA) funded by required attorney dues in most states. And, that this
funding cannot make up for the drastic cutbacks in LSC. Further, that attorney pro bono
services are another method of providing services to the poor, and theoretically an
attorney could provide the legal representation part for a client on the collaborative panel.
And, that in essence to truly make this accessible to lower income parties, both lawyers
would theoretically have to provide pro bono services, a not altogether unheard of idea.
Last, that while most states make pro bono representation optional, a few are moving
towards a mandatory requirement.)).
90
See U.S. CONST. AMEND. VII (providing that there is a right to counsel for certain
classes of crimes and potential sentences; The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted this as a right to counsel to those unable to provide for themselves.).
91
Trubek, supra note 88, at 2533-2534.
92
Id. at 2534.
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duty directly contradicts the inability of lower income families to access
what is acknowledged by many in the legal profession, including the
American Bar Association, to be the methodology of choice in
dissolution cases. Instead of keeping collaborative processes inaccessible
due to high fees and mandatory panels, there needs to be a shift to a more
accessible framework for middle and lower income parties. Attorney
organizations, social service agencies and other organizations dedicated
to providing legal access for the poor have made inroads in developing
new programs to try to meet these needs. 93
Law schools, too, have joined in the effort to provide legal
services to the poor; the vast majority if not all law schools today require
some hourly commitment for pro bono services. 94 Clinical and
externship programs exist in virtually all law schools for the purpose of
providing legal help for indigent clients. 95 The idea that requiring pro
bono hours in law school will carry over to practice seems to hold forth;
well over 100,000 lawyers participate in pro bono programs sponsored
by their Bar organizations and LSC. 96
Such programs have engendered thoughts on ways to bring
legal programs such as collaborative family law to lower income clients.
One such avenue of representation is the clinics and externships that
exist within virtually all law schools. 97 The University of Virginia
created a Family Alternative Dispute Resolution Clinic (“the Family
ADR Clinic” or “clinic”) to teach mediation and collaborative family law
methods to law students. 98 Students in the clinic learn mediation and
collaborative law skills, the idea being to train them to move from an
adversarial mindset to a collaborative one. 99
93

Id. at 2535.
The author’s law school, Barry University School of Law, requires students to
complete forty hours of pro bono work over the course of the students’ legal education;
however, many complete far more. The author’s law school also requires students to
complete twelve hours of professional responsibility hours as a prerequisite for
graduation. In this respect, the reported hours are well above and beyond the traditional
Professional Responsibility doctrinal course(s).
95
Trubek, at 2546.
96
Id.
97
The author’s law school, Barry University School of Law, aspires to develop an
externship program whereby students are placed in collaborative law firms, and learn all
the collaborative processes from the attorneys. The author’s law school also aspires to
create a Collaborative Family Law Clinic similar to the one discussed throughout this
article.
98
Kimberly C. Emery, Assisting Indigent Families in Conflict: A Pro Bono Test Drive
for a Family
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Clinic, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 239 (2010).
99
Id. at 239-40 (explaining that since attorneys frequently enter negotiations with an
adversarial mentality, the hope is to train future attorneys as students to move to a nonadversarial mindset.).
94
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The collaborative aspects of this clinic included the
disqualification agreement required in formal collaborative family law
settings. The idea is to allow the students to look at the process strictly
from a settlement standpoint; utilizing this formal agreement takes away
any reason to think about other strategies. 100 One of the drawbacks to the
clinic setting however was the inability to bring the other professionals
typically found on the collaborative family law panel into the process;
instead the clinic relied on a lawyer-lawyer approach, similar in real
practice to a negotiated settlement but without the ability to proceed to
litigation. 101
While the idea of providing low income collaborative law
representation through a law school clinic setting seems ideal, in reality it
has faced challenges. Because collaborative family law, unlike
mediation, is not required in Virginia, the school has had a difficult time
recruiting enough low income families to participate, and more extensive
outreach is deemed necessary to educate the public to its benefits and
availability. 102
It has also been a challenge to channel the immediacy needs of
lower income families to the more formal process of the collaborative
method, where the parties have the bulk of the responsibility for
determining the issues and providing the settlement choices. 103
V. CONCLUSION
While it is disappointing that the clinic experiment described
above has not sufficiently drawn in lower income parties to its
collaborative family law trial, this type of program remains one of the
best ways to expand the methodology to lower income parties. Programs
that pair attorney, mental health and even financial expert pro bono
hours, as well as law school clinical settings, offer an opportunity to
provide such services that are simply not available through public
funding. 104 Until and unless we are able to truly expand to these groups,
100

Id. at 243.
Id. at 244. (explaining that one of the problems with pro bono or low income panels is
that: one would have to find not only attorneys, but mental health and financial
professionals willing to provide the services. And, that the school did attempt to draw in
the Psychology department to become part of the “team,” but has not made sufficient
headway in that yet.).
102
Kimberly C. Emery, Assisting Indigent Families in Conflict: A Pro Bono Test Drive
for a Family Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Clinic, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
239, 257-58 (2010).
103
Id. at 258.
104
Id. (explaining that although the financial expert is considered an integral part of the
collaborative family law panel, it is debatable whether it is needed in all cases, especially
those involving lower income participants. And, that this is way to save money, by
101
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and thereby provide collaborative family law services to the masses,
litigation, with all its negative qualities for family law cases, will remain
the default mechanism. It is imperative that we move towards a new
collaborative law paradigm to bring all our families the ability to better
resolve their conflicts and help their members.

allowing parties to determine the actual need for all the members of the panel, although
the financial expert would be the most logical to be an option.).

